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CONFERENCE REMARKS:
“JUSTICE ON THE BRINK” AND
THE RULE OF LAW
Linda Greenhouse
INTRODUCTION
Linda Greenhouse is a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist known for
her coverage on the Supreme Court for the New York Times between 1978
and 2008. She is currently a Clinical Lecturer in Law and a Senior Research
Scholar in Law at Yale Law School. The University of Dayton School of Law
and University of Dayton’s Law Review had the distinguished honor of
presenting Ms. Greenhouse with the first Susan Newhart Elliott Award for
Excellence in Legal Scholarship at the 29th annual Dayton Bench-Bar
Conference held at Sinclair Conference Center in Dayton, Ohio, on
November 5, 2021. At this event, she made these remarks regarding her new
book: Justice on the Brink: The Death of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Rise of
Amy Coney Barrett, and Twelve Months that Transformed the Supreme Court.
We hope you enjoy her insights as much as we have.*
REMARKS
There is no single, one-dimensional narrative that captures the story
of today’s Supreme Court. My new book does not purport to have one. 1
Rather, it is a month-by-month chronicle of the last term of the Supreme
Court, the term with three Trump-appointed justices, written in real-time as
the term unfolded. Certainly, inflection points and themes emerged—but not
a single narrative, and I do not propose to offer you one this morning.
Instead, I am going to talk about recent events at the Court and put
them in context, to try to illuminate what they might mean for the future—
emphasis on might.
I will begin with something that happened just a week ago. 2 Pending
at the Court was an emergency application filed by a Christian-right litigating
organization, Liberty Counsel, on behalf of eight healthcare workers in Maine
*
Introductory remarks from Editor in Chief of the University of Dayton Law Review, Melissa Mazer,
Class of 2022.
1
See generally LINDA GREENHOUSE, JUSTICE ON THE BRINK: THE DEATH OF RUTH BADER
GINSBURG, THE RISE OF AMY CONEY BARRETT, AND TWELVE MONTHS THAT TRANSFORMED THE
SUPREME COURT. (Random House Publishing Group, 2021) [hereinafter JOTB].
2
Doe v. Mills, 211 L. Ed. 2d 243 (2021).
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challenging the state’s refusal to offer a religious exemption from its Covid
vaccine mandate for those who work in licensed healthcare facilities.
Maine has a number of vaccine mandates and had once offered an opt-out for
those with religious or “philosophical” objections. But in 2019, preceding
and unrelated to the Covid pandemic, the legislature repealed those
exemptions, leaving only medical reasons as a valid excuse for not accepting
one of the state’s required vaccines. That legislative action was later
overwhelmingly approved in a statewide referendum. 3
The refusal to offer a religious exemption was upheld in
Federal District Court and in the First Circuit. 4 Writing for the panel,
Judge Sandra Lynch first examined the state’s rationale for the healthcarespecific mandate itself. Health care facilities were being hit particularly hard
by the pandemic, correlating with the low vaccination rate among their
employees—as low as 68% in intermediate care facilities for people with
intellectual disabilities, while the state’s Center for Disease Control and
Prevention said the vaccination rate had to reach 90% in order to protect the
vulnerable populations of these facilities.
Next, Judge Lynch evaluated the plaintiffs’ claim that the mandate
violated their constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. It did not,
she concluded, because the rule was neutral and generally applicable.
The existence of a medical exemption did not undermine the mandate’s
neutrality because while medical contra-indications were related to the state’s
interest in requiring vaccination, religious exemptions were not.
Simple “rational basis” review therefore applied, and the state’s rule was
constitutional.
The emergency application for injunctive relief claimed, to
the contrary, that the rule was not neutral because it recognized a secular
exemption but not a religious one. Strict scrutiny therefore applied,
the plaintiffs argued, asserting that the state could not demonstrate
the necessary compelling interest.
The Supreme Court denied the application the day the mandate took
effect. There were three dissenting votes. Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion for
himself and Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas relied in large
measure on an opinion from last term’s “shadow docket,” a case called
Tandon v. Newsom. 5 This was one of a series of cases challenging capacity
3

at 5.

See Doe v. Mills, Opposition of State Respondents to Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction,

4
Doe v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-242-JDL (D. Me. Oct. 13, 2021) (order denying motion for injunction
pending appeal); Doe v. Mills, 16 F.4th 20 (1st Cir. Oct. 19, 2021).
5
Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294 (2021). The term “shadow docket,” referring to the Court’s
handling of applications for various kinds of emergency relief, was coined in 2015 by Prof. William Baude
of the University of Chicago. William Baude, Foreword: The Supreme Court’s Shadow Docket,
University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Papers No. 508 (2015). The term has gained
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limitations imposed by states on various kinds of facilities in an effort to curb
the pandemic. Churches challenged limitations on attendance at worship
services as a violation of Free Exercise. In the first half of 2020, when
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was still alive, the Court had upheld the
limitations by votes of 5 to 4, with Chief Justice Roberts joining the four
liberal justices over the vigorous dissent of the four justices to his right: Alito,
Thomas, Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh. 6 But when Amy Coney Barrett
succeeded Justice Ginsburg in November 2020, things changed, and by votes
of 5 to 4 the other way, the Court started striking down limitations as they
applied to worship services, suggesting in unsigned opinions that as long as
any looser restrictions applied anywhere else, limitations on church services
were unconstitutional. 7
Tandon challenged a California rule that limited in-home and
backyard gatherings to three unrelated “households” at a time. Two plaintiffs
who held Bible study in their homes claimed that the rule amounted to
unconstitutional discrimination against religion because shopping malls and
other commercial venues did not have the same limitation. The District Court
and the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim, pointing out that the rule applied to
in-home gatherings for all purposes, religious and secular: there was no
discrimination. 8
I’ll quote from the account in my book of what happened next:
The tone of the emergency application to the
Supreme Court that followed was bold to the point of
impudence. “This court undoubtedly has better things to do
than sheepdog California and the Ninth Circuit,”
the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Ryan J. Walsh, told the justices.
“Yet until state leaders and lower court judges respect the
boundaries established by the Constitution, the task of
protecting religious believers from overzealous government
officials remains this court’s cross to bear.” As Walsh,
a former Scalia law clerk, surely knew, only a lawyer who
felt certain of holding a winning hand would risk addressing
the court in such terms.
Walsh judged his audience correctly. . . .
The unsigned four-page opinion took the suggestion in the
earlier COVID cases and made it explicit: Government
currency as the Court has increasingly used this docket not only to grant temporary relief but to make
substantive law, as in the Tandon case.
6
The earlier cases, both decided during the 2019 Term, were South Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), and Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020).
7
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020).
8
Tandon v. Newsom, 517 F. Supp. 3d 922 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (denying motion for a preliminary
injunction); Tandon v. Newsom, 992 F.3d. 916 (9th Cir. 2021).
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regulations were subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny
“whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more
favorably than religious exercise. . . . It is no answer that
a State treats some comparable secular businesses or other
activities as poorly as or even less favorably then
the religious exercise at issue.” 9
Tandon v. Newsom thus established, without a grant of plenary
review, without briefing or argument, a “most favored nation” status for
religion: a religious claim had to be treated at least as well as the most
favorably treated secular claim, no matter the objective reason for
the distinction.
And this was the basis for the dissent from the Court’s refusal to
enjoin Maine’s vaccine requirement. Justice Gorsuch complained that
the Court was permitting the state to maintain a “double standard,”
explaining:
This Court has explained that a law is not neutral and
generally applicable if it treats “any comparable secular
activity more favorably than religious exercise”
[citing Tandon]. And again, this description applies to
Maine’s rule. The state allows those invoking medical
reasons to avoid the vaccine mandate on the apparent premise
that these individuals can take alternative measure (such as
the use of protective gear and regular testing) to safeguard
their patients and co-workers. But the state refuses to allow
those invoking religious reasons to do the very same thing
. . . . Maine has so far failed to present any evidence that
granting religious exemptions to the applicants would
threaten its stated public health interests any more than its
medical exemption already does. 10
It takes the votes of five justices to grant a motion for a
stay or an injunction. Clearly, these three dissenters couldn’t count on
Chief Justice Roberts, who had made clear his position that judges should
defer to public health authorities in the midst of a public health emergency.
They couldn’t expect the votes of Justices Breyer, Kagan, or Sotomayor.
But what about the two who had joined the Gorsuch-Alito-Thomas group in
the earlier Covid cases—Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett?

9
JOTB, supra note 1, at 177–78. The filings in the case are on the Supreme Court’s website under
docket no. 20A151.
Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. ___ No. 20A151 (2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20a151_4g15.pdf.
10
Doe v. Mills, 211 L. Ed. 2d 243, 245, 247 (2021).
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And this is what makes this development so interesting.
Justice Barrett wrote a one-paragraph opinion, joined by Justice Kavanaugh,
that explained why they had voted to deny the application.
When this Court is asked to grant extraordinary relief, it
considers, among other things, whether the applicant
“is likely to succeed on the merits.” I understand this factor
to encompass not only an assessment of the underlying merits
but also a discretionary judgment about whether the Court
should grant review in the case. Were the standard otherwise,
applicants could use the emergency docket to force the Court
to give a merits preview in cases that it would be unlikely to
take—and to do so on a short fuse without benefit of full
briefing and oral argument. In my view, this discretionary
consideration counsels against a grant of extraordinary relief
in this case, which is the first to address the questions
presented. 11
While this short statement is not without ambiguity, I take from it
three points. One, Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh do not view the issue in
this case, having been decided in favor of the state, as meriting the Court’s
plenary review. Two, they are attentive to the growing criticism of the Court’s
use of its shadow docket. This is perhaps not so surprising. The criticism has
come primarily from the legal academy, and Justice Barrett spent her
pre-judicial career as a law professor. 12 It was Justice Alito who angrily
denounced critics of the shadow docket in a lecture he gave at Notre Dame in
September. 13 And in fact, the third reason I regard this paragraph as
significant is that I read it as a declaration of independence delivered by
Justice Amy Barrett to Sam Alito: “better not take my vote for granted.”
In my view, anyway, she delivered the same message to him last term’s major
religion case, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, in which she refused to join his
opinion castigating the Court’s majority for refusing to vote to overturn
Employment Division v. Smith. 14 What she said then was that “I am skeptical
about swapping Smith’s categorical antidiscrimination approach for
an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court’s
resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other

Id. (Barrett, J., concurring)(citations omitted).
See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 Harv. L. Rev. 123
(2019).
13
Katie Barlow, Alito Blasts Media for Portraying Shadow Docket in “Sinister” Terms,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 30, 2021, 6:59 PM) https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/09/alito-blasts-media-forportraying-shadow-docket-in-sinister-terms/.
14
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (Barrett, J., concurring); Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11
12
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First Amendment rights—like speech and assembly—has been much more
nuanced.” 15
In my account of the Fulton case in my book, I wrote:
This was a fascinating if cryptic passage. “Nuance”
was not a word often seen in recent years in opinions by
conservative justices. Taken at face value, Barrett’s
expression of skepticism seemed to suggest that the free
exercise of religion was neither more nor less special than
other rights protected by the First Amendment. Was this
what she meant? 16
And now, here she was again. Message to Sam Alito: Yes, we are both
judicial and religious conservatives. But I have my own mind, and I go my
own way.
I may be wrong about this. Both of Justice Barrett’s opinions are, as
I said, ambiguous. But if I’m right, what happened on October 29 could be
the most important development of the term so far.
Ah, you are probably thinking—but what about abortion? And of
course, the two abortion cases, one that challenges the Texas vigilante law,
S.B. 8, and the other that challenges Mississippi’s ban on abortion after
15 weeks of pregnancy, are overshadowing nearly everything else. Had
Justice Amy Barrett voted with the dissent on September 1, when the Court
refused to grant a temporary stay of S.B. 8, the women of Texas would not
have been deprived, without plenary Supreme Court review, of their
constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability. 17 In the
final paragraph of the Gorsuch dissent in the Maine vaccine case,
the dissenters claimed that the “case presents an important constitutional
question, a serious error, and an irreparable injury.” 18 Healthcare workers in
Maine, they complained, “are now being fired and their practices shuttered.
All for adhering to their constitutionally protected religious beliefs.
Their plight is worthy of our attention. I would grant relief.” 19 Substitute
another constitutionally protected right—as of now, anyway—abortion,
for religion, and the “plight” of the women in Texas is surely “worthy of our
attention”—but not, apparently, to a majority of today’s Supreme Court.
As I said at the beginning of this talk, extracting a straight-line
narrative from this Supreme Court is hard to do. We can drown in the Court’s
ambiguities. So let me switch gears now and talk about someone who comes
Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1883.
JOTB, supra note 1, at 212.
17
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021) (denial of application for injunctive
relief, Sept. 1, 2021).
18
Doe v. Mills, 211 L. Ed. 2d 243, 247 (2021).
19
Id.
15
16
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to mind when I think about the two subjects of religion and abortion.
That person is Sandra Day O’Connor. September 25 of this year was
the fortieth anniversary of the day she took her seat on the Supreme Court
bench. I think it is useful and clarifying to step outside our current morass
and reflect on her arrival on the Court and her influence while she served
there.
By that time 40 years ago, the Supreme Court had been in operation
for 191 years, with only men serving as justices—of course, only white men
until Thurgood Marshall’s arrival in 1967. From one perspective, 40 years is
shockingly recent—did it really take 191 years for a woman to break that
barrier? But from another perspective, 40 years is a long time ago. Just over
half of Americans today are under the age of 40—which of course means that
most people either were not born when Sandra O’Connor joined the Supreme
Court or—if they are younger than their early 50s—have no memory of that
moment. So, it is incumbent on those of us who were alive and aware in
September 1981 to share that memory and its significance. 20
The distinctive role she carved for herself on the Court is worth
reflecting on at this moment of intense polarization that threatens our sense
of civic order and is lapping at the Supreme Court’s door as well.
Justice Sandra O’Connor was more interested in finding workable solutions
to the problems people brought to the Court than she was in achieving a goal
of doctrinal purity. (For that reason, the legal academy failed to appreciate
her and is only coming around now.) The only Supreme Court justice to have
served in elective office since 1969, when Chief Justice Earl Warren, former
governor of California, retired, she cared about the practical impact of the
Court’s decisions. She understood that the meaning of a Supreme Court
decision does not ultimately reside in United States Reports but in what judges
and ordinary members of the public make of it and do with it.
People labeled her the Court’s “swing justice,” a term she found
offensive because it ascribed to her a motivation opposite to the one she felt—
not to “swing,” but to attach herself firmly to the side that made the most
sense, not as pure doctrine but as how the Supreme Court’s voice would land
in the midst of the ongoing national conversation. That meant that neither her
fellow justices, nor the Supreme Court bar, nor the public could take her vote
for granted. Her vote had to be earned.
If you infer from what I have said so far that I think today’s
Supreme Court could use a Sandra Day O’Connor, you would be right.
I could stand here and fill our time together by quoting from her opinions, but
I will not do that. I will quote from just one, one of her very last opinions,
one that I think encompasses the wisdom derived from what was by June 2005
20
For an informative recent biography, see EVAN THOMAS, FIRST: SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, AN
INTIMATE PORTRAIT OF THE FIRST WOMAN SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (New York: Random House, 2019).
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nearly 25 years of dealing with the always heavily-freighted matters
of church and state. The case was McCreary County v. American Civil
Liberties Union. 21 The question was whether a Kentucky county’s highly
politicized placement of a Ten Commandments display on its courthouse wall
violated the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter wrote the majority opinion
for a 5-to-4 Court holding that it did. Justice O’Connor joined that opinion
and filed a concurrence of her own, one that I would, if I could, post on
the Supreme Court’s front door.
“At a time when we see around the world the violent consequences
of the assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may count
themselves fortunate,” she observed. 22 And she went on: “Those who would
renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must therefore answer
a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that has served us so well
for one that has served others so poorly?” 23
That question is one that I see as not confined to the religion clauses.
It is one I would hope that justices ask themselves on a regular basis: why
change? why now? Sometimes the answer is obvious, as it was to six justices
in Lawrence v. Texas and in other rights-expanding decisions, we could all
name: because there’s an injustice to be corrected, a constitutional lacuna
to be filled, a better understanding of the meaning of due process. 24
Sometimes the honest answer, as Justice Kagan in dissent interpreted the
majority’s opinion in the Janus case in 2018, is “because we can.” 25
It is a question that needs answering now as the Court appears on the
verge of overturning Roe v. Wade, either explicitly or functionally. 26
Justice Sandra O’Connor was presented with this question in 1992, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey. 27 Not even ten years earlier, soon after her
arrival at the Court, she had emerged as a sharp critic of Roe in a dissenting
opinion in one of the early post-Roe cases, Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health. 28 The framework of Roe v. Wade, she asserted, was
“on a collision course with itself” as the date of fetal viability moved
inevitably back toward the moment of conception. 29
In this opinion, Justice O’Connor was going by instinct rather than
science. As briefs filed by medical organizations in subsequent abortion cases
informed the Court, there had been no dramatic change in the date of viability
and no prospect that, due to anatomical realities of the developing fetus’s
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

545 U.S. 844 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 882 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See 462 U.S. 416, 451–74 (1983) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 458 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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lungs and brain, that there would be. We do not know for sure whether
Justice O’Connor read those briefs, but she began to modify her position on
abortion and never again mention the so-called “collision course.” When in
the Planned Parenthood case the continued existence of the right to abortion
was in grave doubt, she gave her vote to those who would preserve the right.
The Supreme Court is, as political scientists and as justices
themselves have observed, a teacher. 30 Its decisions have carried weight
because—well, because we the public assumed they carried weight. Political
scientists have studied what they call the Court’s legitimating function. In the
Hazelwood decision some years ago, the Court held that the First Amendment
did not give student newspaper editors in a public high the right to put out the
paper free of censorship by school authorities. 31 A political scientist
conducted an experiment. He convened two groups of people who had not
heard of the Hazelwood decision. To one group, they described the facts and
then said that the local school board had voted to give the school’s principal
the authority to censor the school paper. This group reacted with considerable
alarm. The other group was informed that it was the Supreme Court that had
interpreted the Constitution as giving the principal this authority. This group
found the decision perfectly acceptable. That is an example of the
legitimating function. 32
Of course, the fate of high school newspapers was not a question of
high political salience. But typically, even more highly charged controversies
were subject to the legitimating function. In the immediate aftermath of Roe
v. Wade, for example, public support for the right to abortion actually
increased, according to public opinion polling at the time. This was before
the Republican Party hitched its wagon to abortion as a wedge issue, before
opinion on abortion became part of an individual’s political and cultural
identity. When it was simply a Supreme Court question, the public was quite
content with the outcome. 33
More recently, however, the legitimating function seems to have lost
its purchase. In 2012, after the Court rejected the first big challenge to the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), public opinion on the ACA—Obamacare—
30
See e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National PolicyMaker, 6 J. of Pub. L. 279 (1957).
31
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
32
Jeffrey J. Mondak, Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and Contexts of
Legitimation, 47 Political Research Quarterly 675, 676 (1994).
33
For post-decision polling data on public attitudes toward abortion, see William Ray Arney &
William H. Trescher, Trends in Attitudes Toward Abortion, 1972–1975, 8 Family Planning Perspectives
117 (1976). The authors observe that, “[i]t is notable that the 1973 NORC [National Opinion Research
Center] survey, fielded just two months after the 1973 Supreme Court decisions, showed a remarkable
liberalization of abortion attitudes on the part of all groups and subgroups of American society.” Id. at
124. For an account of the subsequent politically-driven development of party realignment over the
abortion issue, see Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions
About Backlash, 120 Yale L. J. 2028 (2011).
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was unchanged, frozen in place. While the decision in National Federation
of Independent Business v. Sebelius came as a relief to half the population,
the other half regarded it as fundamentally illegitimate. 34 Political feelings
were so entrenched that a Supreme Court decision could not move the
needle. 35
We hear a lot of talk these days about the Court’s “legitimacy”—is it
in jeopardy, can it be saved. What do we mean by legitimacy in the context
of the Supreme Court? In a recent book, Professor Richard Fallon of Harvard
Law School offered a useful three-part definition. 36 There are three kinds of
legitimacy, he wrote. There is legal legitimacy, which stems from
a perspective internal to law. Has the Court reached its result by means of an
interpretive method that is generally accepted within the legal culture?
Then there is sociological legitimacy, which has an external
perspective. Does the Court’s output comport with the public’s view of how
the Court should be resolving the conflicts that we bring to it?
And finally, there is moral legitimacy, which depends on whether the
Court is behaving in a way that “we the people” deem worthy of our respect
at the deepest level.
Obviously, the three kinds of legitimacy are not always aligned.
What happens when a decision answers a problem from a strictly legal
perspective, making plausible use of available precedents and tools of
interpretation in ways that would fit comfortably in the pages of a casebook
and yet is at deep variance with the public’s understanding of what the
situation requires. That is when the Court has to go out of its way to explain
itself, to use its powers of persuasion, and fully inhabit its role as teacher.
Perhaps one good example of a mismatch between legal and sociological
legitimacy was the Court’s ruling in Texas v. Johnson in 1989. 37 That was
the decision holding that burning as American flag as a political protest was
expressive activity protected under the First Amendment. The public
response was immediate—bills were introduced, a constitutional amendment
was proposed, politicians jumped on the irresistible bandwagon. It was a big
ruckus that eventually petered out as people realized that the flag was still
flying in every respect that mattered. In fact, Justice Stevens, who dissented
in that case, said later that while he still believed he was right to have
dissented, the decision had an unintended beneficial effect in basically
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
Guy H. Choi, The Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and the Affordable Care Act: The Stability of
Partisan Cleavage Over Health Care (2016) (Unpublished undergraduate paper, UC Berkeley),
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/31m8w6x0 (collecting polling data).
36
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (The Belknap Press of
Harvard Press, 2018). See also Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 Harv.
L. Rev. 2240 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
SUPREME COURT (2018).
37
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
34
35
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eliminating flag-burning. “What once was a courageous act of defiant
expression is now perfectly lawful and therefore is not worth the effort,”
he told an audience in Chicago. 38
I have not said anything about moral legitimacy because that is above
my pay grade, but we can probably think of cases in which legal and
sociological legitimacy are aligned, but the result still fails the moral
legitimacy test. We can think of some criminal cases, including capital cases;
of course, morality is in the eye of the beholder, or the judge, which is why
I cannot dwell productively on it. I might mention the Court’s recent shadowdocket performance in the Texas abortion case. The unsigned five-member
per curiam opinion rehearsed various procedural obstacles that prevented the
Court from granting the requested emergency stay of the Texas vigilante law
to protect access to abortion in the state while the courts figured out the merits.
And maybe the five justices were correct—maybe this was too much of
a jurisprudential stretch.
Even so, to permit the second most populous state to shut down
access to abortion without briefing or argument, in my opinion, failed the test
of moral legitimacy. It would have been so simple to stay the implementation
of the Texas law long enough to sort out the merits, or at least to wait until
the Court decides the constitutionality of a pre-viability abortion ban in the
Mississippi case scheduled for argument on December 1. 39 The country has
gone 250 years without a law like Texas’s S.B. 8, so it seems to me we could
have waited a few months to see whether it meets any kind of test of
constitutionality.
Compare the Court’s reaction earlier this month to a requested stay
of execution brought by a Texas death-row inmate who claimed a Free
Exercise right to have his pastor not only present at the execution but able to
touch him during the lethal injection procedure. Unlike a claim to the wellestablished right to abortion, this Free Exercise claim was completely novel.
Yet the Court not only granted the stay but at the same time granted plenary
review of the inmate’s case and scheduled argument for early November. 40
Could the difference between this treatment and the Court’s response to the
Texas abortion case be that this case purports to involve religion? The grant
of cert., in this case, prompts two thoughts. One, perhaps anyone filing
an emergency application at the Supreme Court would be well advised to tack
38
Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, Who Led Liberal Wing, Dies at 99,
N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/us/john-paul-stevens-dead.html
(Justice Stevens’s New York Times obituary recounts his unpublished remarks).
39
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health, docket no. 19-1392, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/19-1392.html
(last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
40
Ramirez v. Collier, docket no. 21-5592. See Linda Greenhouse, Why Did the Supreme Court Stay
This Execution?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2021. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/opinion/supremecourt-religion-execution.html
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on a religious claim. Second—if the Supreme Court has become so
squeamish about the death penalty as to think there might be a constitutional
right to have a member of the clergy hold a condemned inmate’s hand as
poison is injected into his veins, it might be time for the justices to take up the
question of the constitutionality of capital punishment itself.
But there seems not the slightest possibility of that happening.
Between July 2020 and January of this year, the Court allowed the federal
government, which had not executed anyone since 2003, to proceed with
a series of 13 executions—the most in 120 years, nearly doubling the seven
executions carried out in 2020 by all states combined. Many of the cases were
troubling, but the Court was undeterred, promptly rejecting requested stays of
execution or overturning stays that lower courts had granted.
Troubling as those cases were, a glaring procedural irregularity made
the final case, that of Dustin Higgs, even more disquieting. 41 Higgs had been
convicted and sentenced to death twenty years earlier in Maryland for his
participation in a triple murder on federal property. (He was not the
triggerman; the actual killer pleaded guilty and received a life sentence, but
Higgs maintained his innocence and insisted on going to trial.) Under the
Federal Death Penalty Act, a death sentence must be carried out “in the
manner prescribed by the state” that imposed it.42 However, Maryland had
repealed its death penalty statute in 2013, making Higgs’s execution
impossible if the statute was to be applied as written. The Justice Department
filed a motion asking a federal district judge in Maryland to designate Indiana,
where Higgs was housed on the federal death row, as the appropriate state for
reference under the statute. The judge refused on the grounds that he had no
authority to make such a change. The Fourth Circuit granted a stay of
execution so that it could consider “the novel legal issues presented” and
scheduled oral argument for January 27. 43
That date, of course, fell a week after Inauguration Day, and the
Trump administration could not wait that long. So, the acting solicitor
general, Jeffrey Wall, went directly to the Supreme Court, asking the justices
to overturn the District Court without waiting for the Fourth Circuit. Higgs
should not be handed such an “absurd windfall,” Wall wrote in the “petition
for a writ of certiorari before judgment.” 44 The Supreme Court rarely grants
such a petition, but it promptly granted this one, vacating the Fourth Circuit’s
stay and overturning the District Court with instructions to treat Indiana as if
41
United States v. Higgs, No. 20-927. The filings in this case are posted on the Court’s website
www.supremecourt.gov under docket no. 20A134.
42
18 U.S.C. 3596(a).
43
Petition United States v. Higgs, No. 20-927 at 3. The filings in this case are posted on the Court’s
website www.supremecourt.gov under docket no. 20A134.
44
Petition for writ. No. 20-927 https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/briefs/2021/01/25/20-927_
united_states_v._higgs_petition_for_cert_before_judgment.pdf
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it had been the state that imposed the death penalty all along. The unsigned
order offered no explanation of the majority’s reasoning.
Justice Kagan noted her dissent. Justice Breyer, who in 2015 had
called for the Court to reconsider the constitutionality of the death penalty,
wrote a brief dissenting opinion, its tone more sorrowful than angry. “What
are courts to do when faced with legal questions of this kind?” he asked. 45
“Are they simply to ignore them? Or are they, as in this case, to ‘hurry up,
hurry up?’” 46
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s ten-page dissenting opinion radiated fury.
She began by listing the names of the twelve federal inmates already executed
in what she called “this expedited spree of executions.” 47 The list was
an obvious allusion to the “Say their names” mantra of the Black Lives Matter
movement. She noted that with Higgs’ imminent execution, “the Federal
Government will have executed more than three times as many people in the
last six months than it had in the previous six decades.” 48
Justice Sotomayor clearly knew that she was not going to change any
colleague’s mind. Her project was to make as precise a record as possible of
the Court’s behavior. Noting that “this court has consistently rejected
inmates’ credible claims for relief,” she went on:
The Court has even intervened to lift stays of execution that
lower courts put in place, thereby ensuring those prisoners’
challenges would never receive a meaningful airing.
The Court made these weighty decisions in response to
emergency applications, with little opportunity for proper
briefing and consideration, often in just a few short days or
even hours. Very few of these decisions offered any public
explanation for their rationale.
This is not justice. 49
She cited the Court’s rule governing requests to the justices to accept
a case directly from the District Court without waiting for a decision from the
Court of Appeals. Under the Court’s Rule 11, such a request requires
“a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify
deviation from normal appellate practice and to require immediate
determination in this Court.” 50 The government’s request in the Higgs case
fell “far short” of that standard, she said, explaining: “After failing to act since
Higgs’ sentence was imposed in 2001, the Government gives no compelling
45
46
47
48
49
50
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reason why it suddenly cannot wait a few weeks while courts give his claim
the consideration it deserves.” 51
“There can be no ‘justice on the fly’ in matters of life and death,”
Justice Sotomayor wrote in her concluding paragraph:
Yet the court has allowed the United States to execute
thirteen people in six months under a statutory scheme and
regulatory protocol that have receive inadequate scrutiny,
without resolving the serious claims the condemned
individuals have raised. Those whom the Government
executed during this endeavor deserved more from this
Court. 52
Higgs was executed at 1:23 A.M. the next morning, January 16,
a Saturday, four days before Donald Trump would board Air Force One for
the last time in order to fly to Florida and avoid the inauguration of his duly
elected successor.
Two years ago, Donald Verrilli, who served as solicitor general in the
Obama administration, gave a lecture at the Chautauqua Institution in which
he used a phrase, an image, that has stuck with me. The phrase was “on the
level.” 53 He explained that this everyday phrase has roots in Freemasonry,
which uses symbols of stonecutting and carpentry as part of its visual
vocabulary. The level is an essential tool of those professions. Something is
“on the level” if it is, as Don Verrilli put it, “straight and true all the way
across.” 54
Applied to government, he explained, being on the level means the
government “is doing things for the reasons it says it is doing them”—a
simple yet vital part of the trust necessary for democracy to function. 55 Within
the constitutional framework, it’s possible to see the Supreme Court’s job as
making sure that government is functioning on the level—that the other two
branches, along with executive branch agencies, are operating within their
constitutional or statutory authority—that the reasons they give when their
actions are challenged are the real reasons and are sufficient to explain and
justify the challenged action. This was the Court’s reasoning behind the
Trump administration’s few but notable losses—in the census case two years
ago, when Chief Justice Roberts said in almost so many words that
the administration’s stated rationale for rejecting the opinion of its in-house
professionals and adding a citizenship question to the 2020 census was not
51

Id.
Id. at 652.
53
Donald Verrilli’s lecture is unpublished. A video of the lecture is available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTUqWGwpbNs at 9:12.
54
Id. at 10:24.
55
Id. at 12:20.
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the real reason. 56 It was not on the level. And ditto for the Court’s rejection
in this past term of the administration’s attempted rescission of the Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program. 57 In the Court’s two most
recent abortion cases, Whole Woman’s Health in 2016 and June Medical in
2020, it’s possible to read Justice Breyer’s very measured opinions as
explaining exactly how the states of Texas and Louisiana, in enacting the
laws at issue, had not acted on the level, claiming a reason for their onerous
regulation of abortion clinics that was not the real reason. 58
But in other instances, of course, it is the Court’s own actions that
may be regarded as not on the level. And that brings me back to the shadow
docket. If the Court is a teacher, what lesson is the public supposed to draw
from an unsigned midnight ruling that has the effect of changing the legal
status quo without having previously invited the public, or at least the bar,
in on the conversation by means of briefing and argument?
A Gallup poll issued earlier this fall found public approval of the
Court to be near an all-time low, 40 percent. 59 To note that is not to suggest
that the Court should be running a popularity contest—one it would win since
other government institutions fare even worse. But we need a Court that is
perceived as on the level—one that even those who are disappointed or
infuriated by the outcome in particular cases can still regard as operating
within a framework of legitimacy. That is not simple. We know there is not
a single “level” that provides a clear answer to our most pressing problems.
Any Supreme Court faces a series of choices—when to weigh in, when to
hold off, where to find the balance between judicial overreach and judicial
abdication. For this Supreme Court, those choices take on an urgency driven
by the politics that have surrounded recent appointments.
President Biden’s commission on the Supreme Court, an
ideologically diverse group of some three dozen members, most of them
academics, has attracted an array of suggestions for changing the Court’s
structure, operations, and more fundamentally, its role in American life. 60
The range of responses to the commission’s solicitation of ideas is bracingly
wide. Whether this project will lead to anything concrete is a wide-open
question, but as a thought experiment, it promises to be quite fascinating.
What the dozens of invited witnesses seem to have in common is
a felt need to push some kind of re-set button that might lower the temperature
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2578 (2019).
Dep’t of Homeland Sec’y v. Regents of the University of California, 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020).
58
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); June Medical Services v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
59
Jeffery Jones, Approval of U.S. Supreme Court Down to 40%, a New Low, GALLUP (Sep. 23, 2021),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/354908/approval-supreme-court-down-new-low.aspx.
60
THE WHITE HOUSE, Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/pcscotus/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2022).
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by making the Court something other than it seems to many of us to be at this
moment—the ultimate political prize. Anyone who cares about the Court
should wish the commission well. Its mission is to advise the president, but
its most important audience may be the Court itself.
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